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Whither the community bank? Relationship finance in the
information age
by Robert DeYoung, senior economist and economic advisor, and William C. Hunter, senior vice president and research director,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and Gregory F. Udell, Bank One Chair of Banking and Finance, Indiana University
Technological progress has eroded one of community banks’ traditional advantages—
the information edge from being located close to their customers. Is the community
bank business model still viable in a world where financial relationships do not depend
on face-to-face contact? The authors review some of the existing evidence and look
forward to a research conference where participants will offer new evidence.
ESSAYS ON ISSUES THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK JUNE 2002
OF CHICAGO NUMBER 178
There are more banks per capita in the
United States than in any other devel-
oped economy. The vast majority of these
banks are so-called “community banks,”
identifiable by their small size, their
limited geographic reach, and their tra-
ditional array of banking services. The
central principle of community banking
is “relationship finance,” the idea that
personal interaction between bankers,
small borrowers, and small depositors
creates informational efficiencies that
allow credit to flow more efficiently
and commerce to grow more quickly.
Community banking is consistent with
traditional American beliefs that small
business and local control of resources
are intrinsically good, while concentrat-
ed financial, economic, and political
power is intrinsically bad. For decades,
state and federal banking regulations
based on these ideals locked the U.S.
banking industry into a system of small,
local banks by restricting banks from
doing business across state and county
borders. As a byproduct, these regula-
tions helped preserve thousands of poor-
ly run community banks by shielding
them from outside competitors.
In recent years, advances in communi-
cations technology, financial markets,
and banking production techniques
have reduced the comparative advan-
tages of community banks in collecting
local information. In a world with these
new technologies, the arguments for
protecting local banks from outside com-
petition became much weaker. State
and federal legislatures rolled back and
eventually eliminated banking and
branching restrictions, and the result
has been a dramatic restructuring of
the U.S. banking system.1 Thousands
of community banks have been merged
out of existence, and although thousands
of community banks still remain, the sur-
viving banks tend to be the larger ones.
There are two distinctly different—
though not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive—explanations for the declining
number of community banks. One ex-
planation contends that the decline in
numbers is a long overdue culling of
inefficient, poorly managed community
banks unable to survive in highly com-
petitive, post-deregulation banking mar-
kets. If this is the case, then thousands
of well-managed community banks are
likely to survive. A second explanation
contends that the local banking model
is no longer economically viable due
to technological change. If this is the
case, then the number of traditional
Megamergers between
large banks have received
lots of attention, but nine
out of every ten bank
mergers have eliminated
a community bank.community banks is likely to dwindle
even further in the future.
This Chicago Fed Letter explores the causes
and consequences of the shrinking com-
munity banking sector and considers the
sector’s future. This article also serves as
an introduction to a conference to be
held in March 2003, jointly sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
and the Journal of Financial Services Re-
search, at which academic and regulatory
economists will present new research on
the future of community banking.
Fewer community banks:
Deregulation and mergers
The declining presence of community
banks in the U.S. banking system is
illustrated in figure 1. The top panel
shows that the number of “small” com-
munity banks (banks with assets less than
$100 million) has fallen from around
11,000 banks in 1980 to less than 5,000
banks today. The number of “large” com-
munity banks (assets between $100 mil-
lion and $1 billion) has declined only
slightly since 1980, while the number
of “large banks” (assets greater than
$1 billion) has held relatively steady.
The decline in the population of U.S.
banks was made possible by geograph-
ic deregulation, and was implemented
via mergers and acquisitions. Mergers
between large, well-known institutions
have received the most press—for ex-
ample, the merger of Bank of America
and NationsBank in 1998, which created
the first coast-to-coast U.S. retail bank-
ing franchise—but these “megamergers”
account for only about 5 percent of
U.S. bank mergers since 1980. In con-
trast, about 55 percent of the bank
mergers during the past two decades
combined two community banks.
These mergers would not have been
possible without the repeal of federal
and state banking regulations that his-
torically restricted the size and geo-
graphic mobility of U.S. banks. At first,
banks combined across county lines
with other in-state banks; later on they
expanded by making acquisitions across
state lines. These market extension merg-
ers more than doubled the geographic
reach of the typical U.S. bank holding
company2; intensified competitive rivalry
in the local banking markets targeted
by these mergers3; and con-
centrated industry assets in
a smaller set of increasing-
ly large banks. The bottom
panel in figure 1 shows
that about 15 percent of
total industry assets have
shifted from the communi-
ty bank sector to the large
bank sector since 1980.
Fewer community banks:
Technological change
As industry deregulation was
increasing the degree of





vantages in local markets.
Community banks rely
heavily on local households
and businesses for deposit
financing. But the emer-
gence of mutual funds, on-
line brokerage accounts,
sweep accounts, and other
new savings and investment
vehicles over the past 20
years has provided would-
be bank depositors with a
greater array of options,
increasing the scarcity of
core deposits.4 And be-
cause community banks
have fewer funding options than large
banks—e.g., small banks do not have ac-
cess to bond markets or commercial
paper markets—they must pay higher
interest rates (or, equivalently, charge
lower fees) to attract and retain deposits.
Community banks have traditionally
been the primary source of credit for
small, local businesses, chiefly because
the creditworthiness of these small firms
could be observed only by local banks.
But new lending and financial technol-
ogies are making it easier for small busi-
nesses to transmit information about
their creditworthiness to lenders outside
the local market. Credit scoring models
and online loan applications allow out-
of-market banks to gather information
about small business borrowers (or
mortgage borrowers or credit card bor-
rowers) at relatively low cost, and then
manage the risk of those loans by pool-
ing them and selling off portions in se-
curitized asset markets. This “transac-
tions-based” approach to lending exhib-
its economies of scale, which gives large
banks that make high volumes of loans
a cost advantage over community banks.
New communications technologies allow
large banks to compete in local markets
without ever opening local offices, via
networks of ATMs, Internet kiosks, or
transactional Internet websites. These
nontraditional delivery channels increase
the access of local businesses and house-
holds to financial services and greatly
multiply the number of potential com-
petitors faced by community banks. Re-
cent research shows that the distance
between business borrowers and their
bank lenders has increased substantially
over the past two decades, arguably
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NOTE: Asset categories are defined in year 2000 dollars.
SOURCES: Call Report data and authors’ calculations.because of the increased ability of
lenders to profitably underwrite and
monitor business loans without direct
person-to-person contact.5
Whither the community bank?
Will community banks continue to
decline in numbers and market share,
signaling that the community bank busi-
ness model is no longer economically
viable? Or will these declines slow down
in the near future, leaving a long-run
population of viable community banks
somewhere near today’s numbers?
In a recent study, Robertson (2001) at-
tempts to project the future size distri-
bution of U.S. banks using a complex
statistical analysis based on 40 years of
industry trends.6 Although he projects
that the annual decline in the number
of small banks (which he defines as
having assets less than $2.7 billion) is
slowing down, he also projects that the
overall number of community banks
will shrink substantially. By the year
2007, Robertson projects there will be
only about 2,500 banks with assets less
than $100 million (down from about
4,000 today), only about 1,750 banks
with assets between $100 million and
$900 million (compared with about
2,500 today), and about 500 banks
with assets between $900 million and
$2.7 billion (about the same as today).
Of course, long-run projections based
on past industry trends can be quite in-
accurate, because they cannot take into
account unforeseen changes in technol-
ogy, prices, market demand, and other
factors that influence the structure of
the industry. For example, while a merg-
er may reduce the number of banks in
a local market, it can also change that
market in ways that make it more hos-
pitable to community banks. As docu-
mented by Berger and Udell (1996),
large banks allocate a relatively small
percentage of their assets to small busi-
ness lending, and this raises the con-
cern that industry consolidation will
lead not only to fewer small banks, but
also to less credit for small local busi-
nesses.7 However, these and other re-
searchers have documented some
countervailing effects: Small business
customers that are “abandoned” in the
aftermath of mergers provide expansion
opportunities for local community
banks, and are fertile ground for new-
ly chartered, start-up community banks.8
These phenomena suggest there is a
lower limit to the size of the communi-
ty banking sector.
Profitability data from community banks
also suggest that a substantial number
of community banks will survive.
DeYoung and Hunter (2002) found
that, between 1996 and 2000, average
return-on-equity at the most profitable
50 percent of community banks signif-
icantly exceeded the average return-on-
equity at large commercial banks with
assets greater than $10 billion.9 In other
words, half of the current population
of community banks appear to be
economically viable, all else equal.
Moreover, this study found that highly
profitable community banks used a dif-
ferent business model than large com-
mercial banks, relying more heavily on
core deposits than on purchased funds
and relying more heavily on interest in-
come than on fee-generating activities.
The coexistence of highly profitable
community banks and large, increas-
ingly complex commercial banks sug-
gests a future industry structure in which
there are (at least) two types of profit-
able business models.10 In one business
model, large banks sell high volumes
of basic financial products and retail
banking services (e.g., origination and
servicing of mortgage and credit card
loans and online brokerage and invest-
ment products), with profit margins
driven by the realization of scale econ-
omies. In the other business model,
small banks sell low volumes of more
personalized, high-value-added finan-
cial products (e.g., small business loans
and personalized investment and trust
services), with profit margins driven by
the willingness of customers to pay high
prices for these services. The number
of community banks that can survive
using the latter business model is un-
certain, but it is likely that successful
implementation of this model will re-
quire community banks to complement
their traditional banking practices with
new technologies (e.g., Internet deliv-
ery) and a wider scope of financial
services (e.g., insurance and brokerage).
A research conference on
community banking
The driving forces of change in finan-
cial services—new technology, less reg-
ulation, and growing competition—
seem to be stacked against traditional
community banks. The number of com-
munity banks, and their share of loan
and deposit markets, has been shrink-
ing for over a decade. Given these trends,
it is natural to wonder whether the com-
munity bank business model remains
viable. While it is unlikely that commu-
nity banks will entirely disappear, their
numbers are likely to continue to shrink,
and those that survive may not look
like traditional community banks.
To encourage research on the future
of community banks, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Jour-
nal of Financial Services Research are
sponsoring a research conference—
“Whither the Community Bank?”—
to be held in Chicago on March 14,
2003. Those interested in attending
the conference or submitting a re-
search paper can find additional con-
ference information on the Chicago
Fed website at www.chicagofed.org.
The conference will address the fol-
lowing questions: If community banks
do not survive in their current tradition-
al form, what will be lost? How might
future community banks differ from to-
day’s community banks? Will commu-
nity banks compete directly with large
full-service banks, or will they seek out
Michael H. Moskow, President; William C. Hunter,
Senior Vice President and Director of Research;  Douglas
Evanoff, Vice President, financial studies; Charles
Evans, Vice President, macroeconomic policy research;
Daniel Sullivan, Vice President, microeconomic policy
research;  William Testa, Vice President, regional
programs and Economics Editor; Helen O’D. Koshy,
Editor; Kathryn Moran, Associate Editor.
Chicago Fed Letter is published monthly by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. The views expressed are the
authors’ and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve System. Articles may be reprinted if the
source is credited and the Research Department
is provided with copies of the reprints.
Chicago Fed Letter is available without charge from
the Public Information Center, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, P.O. Box 834, Chicago, Illinois
60690-0834, tel. 312-322-5111 or fax 312-322-5515.
Chicago Fed Letter and other Bank publications
are available on the World Wide Web at http://
www.chicagofed.org.
ISSN 0895-01641 The Riegle–Neal Act of 1994 legalized
interstate banking and branching in the
U.S., following more than 20 years of ad
hoc deregulation by state governments.
2 See Allen N. Berger and Robert DeYoung,
2001, “The effects of geographic expan-
sion on bank efficiency,” Journal of Finan-
cial Services Research, Vol. 19, April/June,
pp. 163–184.
3 See Robert DeYoung, Iftekhar Hasan, and
Bruce Kirchhoff, 1998, “The impact of
out-of-state entry on the efficiency of lo-
cal banks,” Journal of Economics and Busi-
ness, Vol. 50, pp. 191–204; Douglas D.
Evanoff and Evren Örs, 2001, “Banking
industry consolidation and productive
efficiency,” Proceedings of a Conference on
Bank Structure and Competition, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp. 216–226;
and Gary Whalen, 2001, “The impact of
the growth of large, multistate banking
organizations on community bank profit-
ability,” Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, working paper, No. 5.
4 See Hesna Genay, 2000, “Recent trends
in deposit and loan growth: Implications
for small and large banks,” Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter,
No. 160, December.
5 See Mitchell A. Petersen and Raghuram
Rajan, 2002, “The information revolution
and small business lending: Does distance
still matter?,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
6 See Douglas D. Robertson, 2001, “A Markov
view of bank consolidation: 1960–2000,”
Office of the Comptroller of the Curren-
cy, working paper, No. 4, September.
7 See Allen N. Berger and Gregory F. Udell,
1998, “Universal banking and the future of
small business lending,” in Universal Bank-
ing: Financial System Design Reconsidered,
Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter (eds.),
Toronto, Canada: Irwin, pp. 558–627. Other
studies have documented the conditions
under which lending to small businesses
declines after bank mergers: William R.,
Keeton, 1996, “Do bank mergers reduce
lending to businesses and farmers? New
evidence From Tenth District states,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 63–75;
Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, 1998,
“Bank consolidation and small business
lending: It’s not just bank size that mat-
ters,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol.
22, No. 6, pp. 799–819; Ben R. Craig and
João A. C. Santos, 1998, “Study of the
banking consolidation impact on small
business lending,” Proceedings of a Confer-
ence on Bank Structure and Competition,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, pp.
569–588; and Philip E. Strahan and James
P. Weston, 1998, “Small business lending
and the changing structure of the banking
industry,” Journal of Banking and Finance,
Vol. 22, No. 6–8, pp. 821–845.
8 See Allen N. Berger, Anthony Saunders,
Joseph Scalise, and Gregory F. Udell, 1998,
“The effects of bank mergers and acquisi-
tions on small business lending,” Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 50, pp. 187–229;
William R. Keeton, 2000, “Are mergers
responsible for the surge in new bank char-
ters?,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, Economic Review, First Quarter, pp. 21–
41; and Allen N. Berger, Seth D. Bonime,
Lawrence G. Goldberg, and Lawrence J.
White, 1999, “The dynamics of market
entry: The effects of mergers and acquisi-
tions on de novo entry and small business
lending in the banking industry,” Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, working paper, No. 99-41.
9 See Robert DeYoung and William C.
Hunter, 2002, “Deregulation, the Internet,
and the competitive viability of large
banks and community banks,” in The Fu-
ture of Banking, Benton Gup (ed.), West-
port, CT: Quorum Books, forthcoming.
10DeYoung and Hunter, ibid., provide a de-
tailed treatment of this industry model.
product niches? Will new technologies
erase community banks’ traditional in-
formation-based and relationship-based
comparative advantages, or will tech-
nology create new opportunities for
community banks? What makes today’s
best-practice community banks success-
ful, and will these banks be able to
maintain high returns in the future?
How much would competition in local
markets suffer if community banks dis-
appeared entirely? Are the social and
economic benefits of locally based
banking more crucial for developed
countries or for developing countries?
As community banks evolve, what chal-
lenges will they pose for supervisors
and regulators?